Round functions used as building blocks for iterated block ciphers, both in the case of Substitution-Permutation Networks and Feistel Networks, are often obtained as the composition of different layers which provide confusion and diffusion, and key additions. The bijectivity of any encryption function, crucial in order to make the decryption possible, is guaranteed by the use of invertible layers or by the Feistel structure. In this work a new family of ciphers, called wave ciphers, is introduced. In wave ciphers, round functions feature wave functions, which are bijective Boolean functions obtained as the composition of non-invertible layers, where the confusion layer enlarges the message which returns to its original size after the diffusion layer is applied. Relaxing the requirement that all the layers are invertible allows to consider more functions which are optimal with regard to non-linearity. In order to guarantee efficient decryption we propose to use wave functions in Feistel Networks. With regard to security, the immunity from some group-theoretical attacks is investigated. In particular, it is shown how to avoid that the group generated by the round functions acts imprimitively, which would represent a serious flaw for the cipher. arXiv:1708.08814v1 [math.GR] 
Introduction
Most modern block ciphers belong to two families of symmetric cryptosystems, i.e. Substitution-Permutation Networks (SPN) and Feistel Networks (FN), and are obtained as composition of round functions. Each round function is a key-dependent permutation of the plaintext space, designed in a such way to provide both confusion and diffusion (see [27] ). Confusion is provided by means of a non-linear layer which applies Boolean functions, called S-boxes, whereas a linear map, called diffusion layer, provides diffusion. In order to perform decryption, invertible layers and the Feistel structure are used in SPN and FN, respectively. In the framework of SPN's, which have been widely studied in last years, especially after the selection process for the NIST standard AES [18] , decryption is performed applying in reverse order the inverse of each layer of the cipher. In the case of FN's, it is the Feistel structure itself to guarantee a fast decryption.
Motivation and design principles It is well-established that the nonlinearity of the confusion layer is a crucial parameter for the security of the cipher. In particular, in order to prevent statistical attacks (e.g. differential [7] and linear [22] cryptanalysis), block ciphers' designers are interested in invertible S-boxes reaching the best possible differential uniformity, which is two. Functions satisfying such property are called almost-perfect non-linear (APN) [23] and are extensively studied. Unfortunately, APN permutations are known only when the dimension s of the input space for the S-box is an odd number, except for the case of the Dillon's function (s = 6) [8] , which nowadays represents the only isolated case [13] . It has been shown that no permutation with s = 4 is APN [11] and the problem is still without answers for s ≥ 8. On the other hand, for implementation needs, the cases when s ∈ {4, 8, 16} would be optimal. In this paper we show how to define ciphers whose S-boxes are APN functions with s inputs, s even. We do this by considering non-invertible S-boxes; more precisely, we focus on injective confusion layers which enlarge the message, and on surjective diffusion layers which reduce the message to its original size. By appending a key addition to these, we obtain a generalised round function which we call a wave function. Consequently a wave cipher is a block cipher featuring wave functions in its structure. In order to guarantee an efficient decryption, we propose to use wave functions inside an FN-like framework.
Algebraic security Algebraic attacks might also represent serious threats, as we elaborate further below. It is possible to link some algebraic properties of confusion / diffusion layers and some algebraic weaknesses of the corresponding cipher. Firstly, in 1975 Coppersmith and Grossman [17] con-sidered a set of functions which can be used to define a block cipher and, by studying the permutation group generated by those, they opened the way to a new branch of research focused on group-theoretical properties which can reveal weaknesses of the cipher itself. As it has been proved in [21] , if such group is too small, then the cipher is vulnerable to birthday-paradox attacks. Recently, in [10] the authors proved that if such group is contained in an isomorphic image of the affine group of the message space induced by a hidden sum, then it is possible to embed a dangerous trapdoor on it. More relevant in [24] , Paterson built a DES-like cipher whose encryption functions generate an imprimitive group and showed how the knowledge of this trapdoor can be turned into an efficient attack to the cipher. For this reason, showing that the group generated by the encryption functions of a given cipher is primitive and not of affine type has became a popular branch of research (see [3, 4, 5, 15, 16, 26, 28, 29, 30] ). In this sense, our purpose is to give sufficient conditions for the primitivity of the group generated by the round functions of a wave cipher. These conditions result naturally from our general investigation of the link between the primitivity of the group generated by the rounds of an SPN and that of an FN.
The paper is organised as follows:
• In Section 2 our notation is presented, as well as some basic definitions and results concerning non-linearity of Boolean functions and primitive permutations group. In particular, after having presented the main differences between SPN's and FN's, we introduce a notion of classical round function, which allows to describe formally both cipher families in a unified way, provided the round key is used as a translation (i.e., the key addition is the usual XOR).
• Section 3 includes our definitions of wave functions and wave ciphers. We also show an example of an APN 4 × 5 S-box, which is suitable to build a strong wave function.
• In Section 4 a group-theoretical result is shown, which, as a consequence, links the primitivity of the action of an SPN with that of an FN (Theorem 4.5). Thanks to Theorem 4.5, we prove that the group generated by the round functions of a wave cipher is primitive under some standard cryptographic assumptions on the underlying wave functions (Theorem 4.9).
• Section 5 concludes the paper and discusses some open problems.
Notation and preliminaries
Throughout this paper we use the postfix notation for every function evaluation, i.e. if f is a function and x an element in the domain of f , we denote by xf the evaluation of f in x. We denote by Im f the range of f and by Y f −1 the pre-image of a set Y .
A block cipher Φ is a family of key-dependent permutations
where M is the message space, K the key space, and M ≤ K . The permutation E K is called the encryption function induced by the master key K.
The block cipher Φ is called an iterated block cipher if there exists r ∈ N such that for each K ∈ K the encryption function E K is the composition of r round functions, i.e. E K = ε 1,K ε 2,K . . . ε r,K . To provide efficiency, each round function is the composition of a public component provided by the designers, and a private component derived from the user-provided key by means of a public procedure known as key-schedule.
In the theory of modern iterated block cipher, two frameworks are mainly considered: Substitution-Permutation Networks (see e.g. AES [18] , SER-PENT [1] , PRESENT [9] ) and Feistel Networks (see e.g. Camelia [2] , GOST [19] ). Figure 1 depicts the more general framework of SPN's, FN's and their round functions; one can note that inside the round function of an FN, a function called F-function is applied to a half of the state. In both cases, the principles of confusion and diffusion suggested by Shannon [27] are implemented by considering each round function / F-function as the composition of key-induced permutation as well as non-linear confusion layers and linear diffusion layers, which are invertible in the case of SPN's and preferably (but not necessarily) invertible in the case of FN's. We now define a class of round functions for iterated block ciphers which is large enough to include the round functions of well-established SPN's e.g. AES, PRESENT, SER-PENT, and the F-function of FN's like Camelia. Notice that, for sake of simplicity, atypical rounds are not considered in this description.
Let n ∈ N and let us denote V = (F 2 ) n . Let us suppose dim(V ) = n = bs and let us write
represents the direct sum of vector subspaces. The subspaces V j 's are called bricks. We denote by Sym(V ) the symmetric group acting on V , i.e. the group of all permutations on V . Let us also denote by AGL(V ) the group The maps γ j ∶ V j → V j are traditionally called S-boxes,
x ↦ x + k represents the addition with the round key k, where + is the usual bitwise XOR.
When used inside block ciphers, the round keys in V are derived by the designer-provided key-scheduling function from the master key K ∈ K. Since, as we will discuss later in detail, studying the role of the key-schedule is out of the scopes of this paper, one can simply suppose that round keys are randomly-generated vectors in V .
In modern literature, terms "SPN" and "FN" may refer to a very diverse variety of ciphers. For the purposes of this paper we choose to focus only on ciphers with a XOR-based key addition. For this reason, saying SPN we refer to any cipher {E K K ∈ K} ⊆ Sym(M) having an SPN-like structure with M = V and having classical round functions on V as round functions, and saying FN to any cipher {E K K ∈ K} ⊆ Sym(M) having an FN-like structure with M = V × V and having classical round functions on V as F-functions. Notice that SPN's featuring a XOR-based key addition have been also called translation-based ciphers in [16] .
It is well-established that the security from standard statistical attacks comes from the interaction between the high non-linearity of the confusion layer and the avalanche effect guaranteed by the diffusion layer. The following section is a quick overview on one of the most used notions of nonlinearity for Boolean functions, which is mainly used to prevent differential cryptanalysis [7] and other statistical attacks.
Notions of non-linearity for Boolean functions
Let f ∶ (F 2 ) s → (F 2 ) t be a vectorial Boolean function and u ∈ (F 2 ) s . The derivative of f in the direction u, denoted byf u , is the function
It is worth noting that whenever f is linear, the derivatives in every direction are constant. Hence, the more the derivatives of f are far from being constant, the more we assume that f is non-linear. In this sense, the following definitions can give a first estimate of the non-linearity of f .
The differential uniformity of f is
It is well-known that δ(f ) ≥ 2, and functions reaching the bound δ(f ) = 2 are called almost perfect non-linear (APN). Furthermore, it is easy to show that, if f is δ-differentially uniform, then for each u ∈ (F 2 ) s ∖ {0}
The requirement of Definition 2.2 is essentially a condition on the pre-images of the derivatives of f . Alternative definitions focused on the images of the derivatives of f has been given e.g. in [14, 16] . In particular, a function f satisfying [16] . It is straightforward to verify that if f is δ-differentially uniform, then it is also weakly δ-differentially uniform.
Group generated by the round functions
As already explained in Section 1, statistical attacks are just some of the issues that can threaten block ciphers. Several researchers have shown in recent years that also algebraic attacks can be effective. In this paper we focus on a particular group-theoretical attack, described in this section.
Let Φ = {E K K ∈ K} ⊆ Sym(M) be an r-round iterated block cipher. We have stressed that the group generated by all encryption functions
can reveal weaknesses of the cipher. However, the study of Γ(Φ) is not an easy task in general, since it strongly depends on the key-scheduling function (for an example of a key-schedule related study, see [6] ). Hence one focuses on a group which is strictly related to Γ(Φ), which allows to ignore the effect of the key-schedule. For this reason, we do not discuss any key-schedule from now on. Since each permutation E K is the composition of r round functions ε 1,K , ε 2,K . . . , ε r,K , for each 1 ≤ h ≤ r, it is possible to define the group
where all the possible round keys for round h are considered, and so the group
Permutation groups
We recall some basic notions from permutation group theory. Let G be a finite group acting on the set M. For each g ∈ G and v ∈ M we denote the action of g on v as vg. We denote by vG = {vg v ∈ G} the orbit of v ∈ M and by
and G-invariant if for any B ∈ B and g ∈ G it holds Bg ∈ B. Any non-trivial and G-invariant partition B of M is called a block system. In particular any B ∈ B is called an imprimitivity block. The group G is primitive in its action on M (or G acts primitively on M) if G is transitive and there exists no block system. Otherwise, the group G is imprimitive in its action on M (or G acts imprimitively on M). We remind the following well-known results which will be useful in the remainder of the paper, and whose proofs may be found e.g. in [12] .
Lemma 2.4. If T is a transitive subgroup of G, then a block system for G is also a block system for T .
Lemma 2.5. Let us assume that M is a finite vector space over F 2 and T its translation group, i.e.
The group T is transitive and imprimitive on M. Moreover, for any proper and non-trivial subgroup U of (M, +), {U + v v ∈ M} is a block system.
Imprimivity attack
When the group Γ ∞ (Φ) turns out to act imprimitively on M, then it is possible to individuate a non-trivial partition B of M which is invariant under the action of Γ ∞ (Φ). Then an attacker Eve can proceed as follows:
Preprocessing
• she chooses a random message in each imprimitivity block and encrypts it using a target encryption function E K ;
• for each selected message, she individuates which block its corresponding ciphertext belongs to. Then the attacker, which has been given a target encrypted message y, performs the following:
Attack
• she determines which block B ′ the target encrypted message belongs to;
• she individuates the corresponding imprimitivity block under the action of E K , i.e. the block B such that BE K = B ′ (see Figure 3 );
• she searches by brute-force for all the meaningful messages in B.
It is now clear that the imprimitivity of the group allows to perform an attack which requires much less than the M operations of a brute force attack. For this reason, it represents a serious flaw for the cipher Φ, and the primitivity of Γ ∞ (Φ) is a design goal.
Wave ciphers
The aim of this section is to define ciphers whose inner layers are not necessarily invertible, in order to use APN vectorial Boolean functions as S-boxes (even when the S-box input size is four or eight). We focus on the case of wave-shaped round functions, which feature a first layer which enlarges the state, a second which reduces its size, and a key addition. These round functions are employed in the place of classical round functions for both SPN's and FN's. To do so, let us define an auxiliary space
The subspaces W j 's are also called bricks.
What follows is a generalisation of the concept of classical round function.
The maps γ j ∶ V j → W j are called S-boxes;
• λ ∶ W → V is a surjective linear map; Notice that, although the hypothesis of each layer being singularly invertible may be relaxed, decryption is granted only if each wave function is overall invertible. The following result gives a condition on the confusion and diffusion layers which ensures that a wave function is a permutation. Lemma 3.2. Let ε k = γλσ k be a wave function. The following are equivalent:
Figure 4: Wave functions
Proof. Let us assume 1. Let
Moreover, notice that if we assume that 0γ = 0, then the first condition of the previous lemma implies that Im γ ∩ Ker λ = {0}.
Using a 4x5 APN function
The function γ 1 ∶ (F 2 ) 4 → (F 2 ) 5 displayed in Figure 5 represents an example of a 4x5 injective function, which is APN, as it can be noted looking at its DDT displayed in Table 1 in the last page of this paper. Each vector is interpreted as a binary number, most significant bit first, and then represented using the hexadecimal notation (e.g. (0, 0, 0, 1) = 1 x ). With an eye on using this function as an S-box for a wave function, one has to verify that there exists a diffusion layer satisfying the hypothesis of Lemma 3.2. It holds Im(γ 1 ) ⊂ (F 2 ) 5 ; moreover it is easy to check that {a + b a, b ∈ Im(γ 1 )} = 31, and the missing vector in (F 2 ) 5 is x def = 17 x . A possible way to design a cipher whose confusion layer applies in parallel b copies of the S-box γ 1 is to determine a diffusion layer λ whose null space is Span This important feature will be also exploited in the following sections.
Feistel Networks with wave functions
Since our goal is to use the previously defined wave functions inside a cipher, we now define a wave cipher as an FN whose F-function is a wave function. Feistel Network's straightforward decryption encourages this choice.
Before defining wave ciphers, we generalise a standard security requirement for diffusion layers [16] to the case of surjective maps. 
In other terms, if π ∶ W → W Ker λ is the canonical projection of W onto W Ker(λ), λ is proper if there exists no wall W ′ = ⊕ j∈I W j of W and
We are now ready to define our new class of block ciphers, having M = V × V as message space. In what follows, 0 n and 1 n denote the zero matrix of size n × n and the identity matrix of size n respectively. Moreover, for any given function f ∶ (F 2 ) n → (F 2 ) n , we denote by f the formal operator
The latter is called the Feistel operator induced by f and, as we will discuss further, allows to give an algebraic description of FN's.
Definition 3.5. An r-round wave cipher Φ is a family of encryption func-
• λ is a proper diffusion layer,
• the key-schedule K → V r , K ↦ (k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k r ), is surjective w.r.t. any brick.
The function ρ def = γλ is called the generating function of the cipher.
Let us notice that the ciphers previously introduced are FN's featuring a wave function as F-function. Indeed, given (
where the operator ε i,K induces the Feistel structure, as shown in Figure 6 . Moreover ε i,K is invertible with the following inverse
It is indeed an easy check that
Note that, as for any FN, the inverse ε i,K −1 of the round function ε i,K does not involve the inverse of the wave function ε i,K .
Let ρ be the generating function of a wave cipher Φ, and ρ the corresponding Feistel operator ρ = 0 n 1 n 1 n ρ .
Then ε i,K = ρ σ (0,k i ) , and so ⟨ T (0,n) , ρ ⟩ is the group generated by the round functions of the wave cipher Φ. In this section, first we show a group-theoretical result which, as consequence, links the primitivity for a Substitution-Permutation Network and the primitivity for a Feistel Network having respectively round functions and F-functions with the same structure. By exploiting this result we prove that the group generated by the round functions of a wave cipher is primitive under some reasonable cryptographic assumptions on the underlying wave functions.
Security reduction
Let us consider the group generated by the rounds of an FN which uses as F-functions the round functions of a primitive SPN. Here we prove a group-theoretical result which implies the primitivity of the group under consideration. In particular this result is used to show that the group generated by the round functions of a wave cipher is primitive if the group generated by the round functions of an SPN-like cipher having as round functions the same wave functions is primitive, as depicted in Fig. 7 .
Let us recall that T (0,n) = {σ (0,k) (x 1 , x 2 ) ↦ (x 1 , x 2 + k)} < Sym(V × V ) and define 
Notice that T n ≅ T (0,n) ≅ T (n,0) < T (n,n) .
Let ρ be any element in Sym(V ), ρ be the corresponding Feistel operator, and let Γ def = ⟨ T (0,n) , ρ ⟩. Since we aim at characterising imprimitivity blocks for Γ using Lemma 2.4 and Lemma 2.5, we need to individuate a transitive subgroup of Γ. For this reason, the following alternative presentation of Γ is useful. Proof. Obviously Γ = ⟨ T (0,n) , ρ ⟩ < ⟨ T (n,n) , ρ ⟩. On the other hand, given
Hence for each k ∈ V it holds ρσ (0,k) = σ (k,0) ρ, and consequently σ (k,0) ∈ Γ. Therefore for each
Being T (n,n) a transitive subgroup of Γ and noticing that the subgroups of T (n,n) are of the form {σ u ∶ u ∈ U }, where U is a subgroup of V × V , we obtain the following.
Lemma 4.2. If Γ is imprimivitive in its action on V × V , then a block system is made of the cosets of a subgroup of V × V , i.e. it is
where U is a non-trivial and proper subgroup of V × V .
Proof. See Lemma 2.4 and Lemma 2.5.
According to Lemma 4.2, in order to prove that Γ is primitive it is sufficient to prove that no subgroup of V × V is a block. The following theorem, due to Goursat [20, , characterises the subgroups of the direct product of two groups in terms of suitable sections of the direct factors (see also [25] ). We apply this result to the additive group V × V . • C is a subgroup of G 2 ,
• B is a normal subgroup of A,
• D is a normal subgroup of C, and
In this bijection, each subgroup of G 1 × G 2 can be uniquely written as
Note that the isomorphism ψ ∶ A B → C D is induced by a homomorphism ϕ ∶ A → C such that (a + B)ψ = aϕ + D for any a ∈ A, and Bϕ ≤ D. Such homomorphism is not unique. Lemma 4.4. In the above notation, given any homomorphism ϕ inducing ψ, we have
Proof. Note first that the right-hand side of (1) is contained in U ψ , since for a ∈ A and d ∈ D we have (a + B)ψ = aϕ + D = aϕ + d + D, that is, (a, aϕ + d) ∈ U ψ . Moreover U ψ is contained in the right-hand side of (1) .
This is our main result of this section. 
Before proving Theorem 4.5, we show how this group-theoretical result can be helpful to us. Let Φ = {E K K ∈ K} ⊆ Sym(V × V ) be an r-round wave block cipher. By Remark 3.6, denoting by ρ def = γλ its generating function, one has that Γ ∞ (Φ) = ⟨ T (0,n) , ρ ⟩ is the group generated by the round functions of the wave cipher Φ. Moreover, ⟨ T n , ρ ⟩ is the group generated by the wave-shaped round functions of an SPN-like cipher whose round functions are ε i,K = ρ σ (0,k i ) . Therefore, from Theorem 4.5, next result directly follows. 
for some (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ V × V . Since (0, 0)ρ = (0, 0ρ), we can assume v 1 = 0 and v 2 = 0ρ. With reference to Lemma 4.4 and its notation, we have U = {(a, aϕ + d) a ∈ A, d ∈ D}, and by (2), for any a ∈ A and d ∈ D there exist x ∈ A and y ∈ D such that (a, aϕ + d) 0 n 1 n 1 n ρ = (x, xϕ + y + 0ρ), that is (aϕ + d, a + (aϕ + d)ρ) = (x, xϕ + y + 0ρ).
Hence, it holds x = aϕ + d, and considering a = 0, we obtain D ≤ A. Otherwise, considering d = 0, we obtain Aϕ ≤ A. Similarly, we have
In this case, for any a ∈ A and d ∈ D there exist x ∈ A and y ∈ D such that (aρ + aϕ + d, a) = (x + 0ρ, xϕ + y).
Hence we have x = aρ+aϕ+d+0ρ. Substituting x = aϕ+d in xϕ+y and being ϕ a homomorphism, it holds y = a + aρϕ + aϕ 2 + dϕ + 0ρϕ. Then, considering a = 0, we obtain y = dϕ, and thus Dϕ ≤ D. Now, in the general case, letting
By Lemma 4.4 and by (4), for any a ∈ A and d ∈ D there exist x ∈ A and y ∈ D such that
that is,
Then, considering a = 0, we obtain (d + v 2 )ρ = y + dϕ + v 2 ρ. Since Dϕ ≤ D, then y + dϕ ∈ D and so
Note that we obtain the equality since ρ is a permutation. If D ≠ {0}, (F 2 ) n , then we proved that the imprimitivity of Γ implies the imprimitivity of Γ. To complete the proof, it remains to consider the cases D = (F 2 ) n and D = {0}.
[D = (F 2 ) n ] We proved that D ≤ A, and from the hypotheses holds that D ≤ C and ψ is an isomorphism between A B and C D. Since D = (F 2 ) n , we have D = C = A = B = (F 2 ) n , which contradicts that U is a proper and by (4) for any a ∈ A there exists x ∈ A such that
Proceedings as before, it holds
Note that for any a ∈ B ≤ A, aϕ = 0 and so we obtain a + v 2 ρ = v 2 ρ for any a ∈ B, that is, B = {0}. Therefore, if D = {0}, also B = {0} and so ϕ = ψ is an isomorphism between A and C. Moreover, since Aϕ is contained in both A and C, then A = C and ϕ is an automorphism of A. If A = {0}, then A = C = D = B = {0}, which contradicts that U is non-trivial. If A is a proper subgroup of (F 2 ) n , then by (5) and since both a + aϕ 2 and aϕ belong to A we have
and so Γ is imprimitive. If A = (F 2 ) n , in equation (5) we can consider v 2 = 0 since aϕ + v 2 is an element of A = (F 2 ) n , so we have (aϕ)ρ = a + aϕ 2 + 0ρ.
Since the function x + xϕ 2 is linear, we proved that ρ ∈ AGL(V ), which is a contradiction.
Conditions on SPN-like wave ciphers
In the light of Theorem 4.5, given a wave cipher Φ whose generating function is ρ, we obtain that the group Γ ∞ (Φ) is primitive if we manage to prove that the group ⟨ T n , ρ ⟩ is primitive. The latter represents the group generated by the rounds of an SPN-like cipher featuring wave functions in the place of classical round functions. Although for such a cipher it may be difficult to design an efficient decryption process, since it has an SPN structure with non-invertible layers, we can still study its theoretical properties. In this section we underline which properties of the generating function ρ guarantee that ⟨ T n , ρ ⟩ is primitive.
Let ρ = γλ be the generating function of a wave cipher. From now on we assume that γ maps 0 to 0, since it is always possible to add 0γ to the round key of the previous round. Then, since λ is linear, it holds 0ρ = 0.
In the following, we define a generalisation of the notion of strong antiinvariance given in [16] , which is a condition in our second main theorem. Let us recall that, as in Section 3,
Definition 4.7. Let j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , b}, γ j ∶ V j → W j be an S-box such that 0γ j = 0, and λ ∶ W → V be a surjective linear map. Given 0 ≤ δ < s, γ j is δ-non-invariant with respect to λ if for any proper subspaces V ′ < V j and The following is the main result of this section. Theorem 4.9. Let ρ = γλ be the generating function of a wave cipher Φ. If there exists 1 ≤ δ < s such that for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , b} the S-box γ j is
• δ-non-invariant with respect to λ, and if Ker λ = ⊕ b j=1 Ker λ∩W j , then ⟨T n , ρ⟩ is primitive (and so it is Γ ∞ (Φ)). Proof. Suppose that ⟨T n , ρ⟩ is imprimitive. For the Lemma 4.8, a block system is of the form {U + v v ∈ V }, for any proper non-trivial subgroup U of V . Since U is an imprimitivity block and ρ ∈ ⟨T n , ρ⟩, U ρ = U + v for some v ∈ V . Moreover, since 0ρ = 0, we obtain U + v = U , and consequently U ρ = U γλ = U. Moreover
and so U γ + Ker λ is a subspace of W .
. . , b}, U π j ≠ {0}}. Then two cases are possible: either
In the first case U = ⊕ j∈I V j is a wall. From (6) it holds
Since γ is a parallel transformation, we have
Thus, from (7) and (8) it follows that
which is a contradiction since λ is proper.
In the second case, let us assume there exists j ∈ I such that U ∩ V j ≠ V j . From (6) we have
where, since both γ and the kernel of λ are parallel,
. . , v b ) ∈ Ker λ, and let us assume that w def = uγ+v ∈ (U γ+Ker λ)∩W j , hence w = (0, . . . , 0, w j , 0, . . . , 0). For l ≠ j we obtain u l γ l = v l , hence v l ∈ Im γ l ∩ (Ker λ ∩ W l ). From Remark 3.3 and since Ker λ is parallel, we have Im γ l ∩ (Ker λ ∩ W l ) = {0}, therefore v l = u l = 0. Thus, (9) and (10) imply that
and, since γ j is δ-non-invariant with respect to λ, then
Furthermore, let u ∈ U such that u j def = uπ j ≠ 0 and v j ∈ V j . Since ⟨ T n , ρ ⟩ is imprimitive, by Lemma 4.8 it follows that (u + v j )γ + v j γ ∈ U λ −1 . Moreover uγ ∈ U γ ⊂ U λ −1 , and so uγ + (u + v j )γ + v j γ ∈ U λ −1 , whose components are null, except possibly for those of the j-th brick, i.e.
which implies that Im(γ ju j ) + u j γ j ⊂ U λ −1 ∩ W j . Being γ j 2 δ -differentially uniform, it is also 2 δ -weakly differentially uniform, and since u j ≠ 0 we obtain
which contradicts (11) .
Notice that in the proof of Theorem 4.9 we actually exploited that every S-box is 2 δ -weakly differentially uniform. Hence, we also proved the more general following result.
Theorem 4.10. Let ρ = γλ be the generating function of a wave cipher Φ.
If there exists 1 ≤ δ < s such that for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , b} the S-box γ j is
• δ-non-invariant with respect to λ, and if Ker λ = ⊕ b j=1 Ker λ∩W j , then ⟨T n , ρ⟩ is primitive (and so it is Γ ∞ (Φ)).
The hypothesis of each S-box being δ-non-invariant w.r.t. λ in Theorem 4.9 can be weakened by adding a reasonable requirement on the diffusion layer. However, for this result does not exist an alternative version using the weak differential uniformity .
Theorem 4.11. Let ρ = γλ be the generating function of a wave cipher Φ. If there exists 1 ≤ δ < s such that for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , b} the S-box γ j is
• (δ − 1)-non-invariant with respect to λ, and if the diffusion layer is such that
• dim(Ker λ ∩ W j ) < s − δ for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , b}, then ⟨T n , ρ⟩ is primitive (and so it is Γ ∞ (Φ)).
Proof. The proof proceeds exactly as that of Theorem 4.9. In this slightly different setting induced from a further requirement on λ, we can conclude that U ∩ V j ≠ {0}. Indeed, being
and having dim(U λ −1 ∩ W j ) ≥ s − δ and dim(Ker λ ∩ W j ) < s − δ, there must be a non-zero element in (U ∩ V j )γ j , and consequently a non-zero element z ∈ U ∩ V j . Then, reasoning as before, using Lemma 4.8 one can prove that Im(γ jz ) ⊂ U λ −1 ∩ W j and Im(γ jz ) ≥ 2 s−δ . Moreover, 0 ∉ Im(γ jz ), since z ≠ 0 and γ j is injective. Hence
The hypothesis of (δ − 1)-noninvariance of γ j leads to a contradiction, hence the desired holds. Assuming that we want to design a 16-bit generating function for a wave cipher whose confusion layer γ applies 4 copies of the S-box γ 1 and whose diffusion layer features a parallel kernel, it is sufficient to determine a proper diffusion layer λ such that Ker λ = Span F 2 {(x, 0, 0, 0), (0, x, 0, 0), (0, 0, x, 0), (0, 0, 0, x)}, where 0 denotes the zero vector in (F 2 ) 5 . The matrix displayed in Figure 8 is an example of such a layer. Moreover, we checked that γ 1 is 0-non-invariant with respect to Ker λ. Consequently, the hypotheses of Theorem 4.11 are satisfied with δ = 1, and hence the obtained generating function ρ = γλ is such that the group ⟨T n , ρ⟩ is primitive. Then Theorem 4.5 implies that the group Γ ∞ (Φ) generated by the rounds of a wave cipher having γλ as generating function is primitive.
Conclusions and open problems
In this work we proposed a new family of ciphers, called wave ciphers, whose round functions are the composition of layers not all invertible. Round functions of a wave cipher are wave functions, bijective functions obtained as the composition of injective non-linear confusion layers enlarging the message, surjective linear diffusion layers reducing the message size, and a key additions. Relaxing the requirement that the S-boxes are permutations allowed to consider APN functions to build confusion layers. In particular we gave an example of 4 × 5 APN function which can be used as S-box in a wave cipher. We proposed to use wave functions as F-functions of Feistel Networks, where computing inverse functions is not required in order to perform decryption. With regard to security we showed that, under suitable non-linearity properties of the Boolean functions involved, the group generated by the round functions of a wave ciphers acts primitively.
Several problems arise from this new construction, such as determining conditions on the wave functions to ensure that the group generated by the round functions of a wave cipher is the alternating group, or studying the resistance of a wave cipher with respect to other statistical attacks, for example studying the impact of differential and linear cryptanalysis on the wave-shaped structure. Finally, to the best of our knowledge, s × t APN functions with s < t are not very much investigated in literature.
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